My interest in capital punishment has been a long-standing one: from an awareness of its extensive use during my years as a law student in South Africa, through my response as an Israel—first to the impact of the Eichmann trial, and then later to the debate over the appropriate punishment for terrorist activities—to my fascination, during sabbatical teaching and research periods in the United States, with the many intriguing facets and urgent issues of the constitutional implications of its use. Moving among three cultures and their totally different approaches has also made me more aware of the international dimensions of the problem as a primary issue of human rights, a factor that is a major aspect of this book.

I will not outline all the transformations in my ideas on capital punishment—only indicate that my move from what might be called a rigid abolitionist position to a more flexible one arises largely from my work, both academic and practical, with the issue of life and long-term imprisonment. The final dimensions of this book, as well as its very title, flow from the recognition that there are not one, but three, ultimate penalties, and that discussion—legal, moral, philosophical, sociological, practical—of any one of them is dependent on attitudes to, and knowledge about, the other two.

As for capital punishment, I accept the validity of most of the arguments that have been advanced for its abolition. I respect the dedication of those who have embarked on battles for the saving of an individual’s life. I object to the use of this punishment in order to further a political cause or to satisfy the base demands of a vindictive public. I reject the standard arguments that the differing aims of deterrence and retribution would be well served by the taking of life. I applaud the worldwide campaign of Amnesty International and like organizations against the death penalty. I myself have contributed to the debate, arguing against using the death penalty as a punishment for those who commit acts of terror in Israel, where I live and work.

Yet I have been unable, over the years, to ignore the gnawing doubts as to the total justification of the absolute abolitionist argument and, in particular, the unwillingness to deal with certain issues that I consider crucial to the debate. It is in the light of my own inner deliberations, the doubts that still possess me, and the dilemmas which I have been unable to resolve, that I present my own view—partly personal, partly political, partly professional, partly pragmatic—in the hope that it will help enrich the debate on what is one of the major moral issues of the modern age.